The authors address problems with “compulsory” arbitration clauses in contracts. Specifically, they note that consumers are misguided about their rights in such cases. In addition, arbitration clauses do not allow the press to cover any proceedings that may result. The arbitration clauses in contracts are written in legalese that consumers do not understand. The authors found that even university students had difficulty understanding the information in such clauses. An example of an actual case is included.

The authors address problems with “compulsory” arbitration clauses in contracts. Specifically, they note that consumers are misguided about their rights in such cases. In addition, arbitration clauses do not allow the press to cover any proceedings that may result. The arbitration clauses in contracts are written in legalese that consumers do not understand. The authors found that even university students had difficulty understanding the information in such clauses. An example of an actual case is included.

Curiously, though he provides in Making It Explicit (MIE) elaborate accounts of various representational idioms, of anaphora and deixis, and of quantification, Robert Brandom nowhere attempts to lay out how his understanding of content and his view of the role of logical idioms combine in even the simplest cases of what he calls paradigmatic logical vocabulary. That is, Brandom has a philosophical account of content as updating potential - as inferential potential understood in the sense of commitment or entitlement preservation (...) - and says that the point of logical vocabulary is to make available the expressive resources to make explicit such semantic structures as arise from discursive scorekeeping practice. Thus, one would expect an account of the updating or inferential potential of sentences involving logical vocabulary, an account which is such as to assign to those sentences the inferential significance necessary for this expressive job. In short, one would expect a semantics of logical vocabulary - &, ν, ∼ → - in terms of the difference an assertion of a sentence involving it makes to the atomic score of a linguistic agent, and a completeness proof for the logic generated by this semantics. Despite this, no such semantics is given in MIE. It is in the current paper. (shrink)

The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument is the argument for treating mathematical entities on a par with other theoretical entities of our best scientific theories. This argument is usually taken to be an argument for mathematical realism. In this chapter I will argue that the proper way to understand this argument is as putting pressure on the viability of the marriage of scientific realism and mathematical nominalism. Although such a marriage is a popular option amongst philosophers of science and mathematics, in light (...) of the indispensability argument, the marriage is seen to be very unstable. Unless one is careful about how the Quine-Putnam argument is disarmed, one can be forced to either mathematical realism or, alternatively, scientific instrumentalism. I will explore the various options: (i) finding a way to reconcile the two partners in the marriage by disarming the indispensability argument (Jody Azzouni [2], Hartry Field [13, 14], Alan Musgrave [18, 19], David Papineau [21]); (ii) embracing mathematical realism (W.V.O. Quine [23], Michael Resnik [25], J.J.C. Smart [27]); and (iii) embracing some form of scientific instrumentalism (Ot´ avio Bueno [7, 8], Bas van Fraassen [30]). Elsewhere [11], I have argued for option (ii) and I won’t repeat those arguments here. Instead, I will consider the difficulties for each of the three options just mentioned, with special attention to option (i). In relation to the latter, I will discuss an argument due to Alan Musgrave [19] for why option (i) is a plausible and promising approach. From the discussion of Musgrave’s argument, it will emerge that the issue of holist versus separatist theories of confirmation plays a curious role in the realism–antirealism debate in the philosophy of mathematics. I will argue that if you take confirmation to be an holistic matter—it’s whole theories (or significant parts thereof) that are confirmed in any experiment—then there’s an inclination to opt for (ii) in order to resolve the marital tension outlined above.. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Andrea J. Pitts and Mark William Westmoreland, eds. Beyond Bergson: Examining Race and Colonialism Through the Writings of Henri Bergson, 255 pages./ Among Bergson’s contributions to philosophical and empirical investigations; such as those centered on freedom, memory, and evolution; exists in the form of his last book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. It is interesting because, as many readers of Bergson have remarked, it does not seem to fit well, primarily in method, with his other (...) endeavors in the pursuit of philosophical exploration and elaboration. Having been mentored by a philosopher who holds this position, I have long shied away from the text that represents Bergson’s last concerted philosophical effort of inquiry. Meanwhile, having been intrigued by the possibility of a more just world and compelled by a desire to serve such an end, I was interested in envisioning what a Bergsonian philosophy of social justice, revolution, or morality would contain. Early on in my readings of Bergson, I felt the seeming applicability of Bergson’s method of intuition to moral and social questions. Over the years, I have devoted significant time to thinking through durational investigations of intensity to problems of social justice. While I have made some inroads to accomplishing this goal, I feel the journey has just begun for me. It was in this context that I was excited at the prospect of this book, and it is this book that has helped me to appreciate some of the ways that Bergson’s philosophy could be adapted to thinking through moral and social questions. To be clear, much work has been done in the way of expounding political or moral philosophies in which Bergson’s thought might be interpreted as a prelude. My reluctance to embrace Two Sources has been a self-imposed hindrance to my engaging in those extra-Bergsonian works for fear of running against the current of Bergson’s earlier texts. My reticence is intended to be taken as neither a slight of Bergson’s Two Sources nor a discounting of those who find inspiration in that work. (shrink)

This three-volume series provides a critical examination of the history of theology in Scotland from the early middle ages to the close of the twentieth century. In Volume Three, the 'long twentieth century' is examined with reference to changes in Scottish church life and society.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Semantics in Aristotle’s OrganonMark WheelerVarious contemporary commentators have made conflicting claims about Aristotle’s theory of meaning. Some have claimed that he has a denotational theory of meaning, others that he has an ideational theory of meaning, and yet others that he has confused the denotational and ideational aspects of meaning.1 Recently, Kretzmann and Irwin have presented arguments which, taken together, imply that Aristotle has no theory of meaning.2I think (...) that all of these views are mistaken. Aristotle, I shall argue, is working with a rather sophisticated and coherent theory of meaning incorporating both denotational and ideational components. In section 1, I reconstruct the general theory of linguistic signification presented in De Interpretatione [End Page 191] 16a3–9, a passage which has been the cornerstone of both ancient and contemporary interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of meaning. I develop an interpretation different in important respects from both the standard view and recent alternatives. Aristotle’s general theory emerges as a remarkably flexible account of the relations among linguistic signs, mental images, and real things.3 In section 2, I recast Aristotle’s general theory in contemporary semantic terminology and respond to various arguments purporting to show that Aristotle hasn’t a theory of meaning as these are now understood.1. ARISTOTLE’S GENERAL THEORY OF LINGUISTIC SIGNIFICATIONIn the present section, I develop an interpretation of Aristotle’s explicit, albeit terse, sketch at De Interpretatione 16a3–9 of the fundamental semiotic relations among written marks, spoken sounds, affections of the soul, and things in the world. In so doing, I consider and reject an argument according to which the passage either doesn’t present a general theory of linguistic signification or, if it does, the theory presented is fatally flawed.4 The results of this section are very general but important enough to warrant isolated attention. I argue that, given Int. 16a3–9, Aristotle is committed to the following claims: (1) Written marks are signs of spoken sounds; (2) spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of mental images; (3) spoken sounds are, by convention, signs of mental images; (4) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real perceptible or intelligible qualities; and (5) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real things.5 [End Page 192]Our passage has been the subject of extensive study. Kretzmann has called it “the most influential text in the history of semantics” (3). It is worth quoting in full:Now spoken sounds [ϕωναί] are symbols [σύμβολα] of affections in the soul [ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ παθημάτων], and written marks [γϱαϕὀμενα] symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks [γϱάμματα] are not the same [τά αὐτά] for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place [πϱώτων] signs [σημει̑α] of—affections of the soul [παθἡματα τῆς Ψυχῆς]—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [ὁμοιώματα] of—real things [πϱάγματα]—are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject.6Traditionally, the passage is taken to present a sketch of Aristotle’s general theory of meaning.7 Standard interpretations run roughly as follows. First, Aristotle lays down three general semantic principles: Written marks signify spoken sounds; spoken sounds signify affections in the soul; and affections in the soul represent things in the world. These principles establish the basic semiotic relations among language, thought, and reality. Second, Aristotle implies (cf. Int. 16a6) that spoken sounds signify in the first place affections in the soul and that, by means of this primary significance, spoken sounds signify in the second place real things.8 I shall call this the ‘Semantic Primacy Thesis. ‘ Third, the affections in the soul with which Aristotle is concerned are thoughts [νοἠματα], and he refers us to book III, chapters 7–8 of the De Anima for further discussion of the nature of these. Lastly, Aristotle is developing a strictly conventionalist theory of linguistic meaning, according to which although all human beings have access to the same affections in the soul and the same real things, different written and spoken languages are used by different communities to signify... (shrink)

The first paper in this pair (Bickhard in Axiomathes, 2015) developed a model of the nature of representation and cognition, and argued for a model of the micro-functioning of the brain on the basis of that model. In this sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented (...) here: sometimes called the Predictive Brain approach. (shrink)

For Kant, moral evil of all sorts - evil that is rooted in a person's character - is manifested in action which, on the one hand, is explicable in terms of an agent's own reasons for action and so imputable, though on the other hand it is, in some sense, irrational. Because such evil is rooted in a person's character, it "corrupts the ground of all maxims" and thus deserves to be called radical evil. Moreover, according to Kant, not only (...) are human beings susceptible to such evil, being evil is an inescapable condition of being human. These claims raise a number of questions, among them the following: How can we ecxplain the possibility of irrational, yet explicable, freely done actions given Kant's views about human agency? What is the nature of radical evil? In what sense is it a corrupting ground of all maxims? What reason does Kant have for claiming that radical evil is an inescapable part of the human condition? In this paper, I focus on these questions. Sections I and II are concerned with some basic themes and distinctions pertaining to Kant's theory of action and practical rationality that will provide a basis for understanding his view of moral evil. In section III, I turn to Kant's analysis of moral evil in its varios manifestations in order to provide, in section IV, a general charcterization of moral evil. In section V, I consider Kant's claim that radical evils corrupts the ground of all maxims, and what this claim implies about the possibility of actions having moral worth. In section VI, I want to consider what we can call Kant's Universality Thesis, viz., his claim that necessarily all human beings are radically evil. In his recent book, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Henry Allison has argued that the UT represents a synthetic a priori claim, and he proceeds to provide a 'deduction' for it, something that Kant failed to do. I argue that Allison's deduction does not work, though I am afraid I don't have a deduction of my own to propose on Kant's behalf, nor do I see how to reconcile Kant's own defense of the UT with its alleged a priori status. Kant's UT remains problematic. Für Kant manifestiert sich das moralisch Böse in allen seinen Varianten - das Böse nämlich, das im Charakter einer Person wurzelt - in Handlungen, die auf der einen Seite vom eigenen Standpunkt des Handelnden her expliziert werden können und die deshalb zurechenbar sind, die aber auf der anderen Seite in einer gewissen Hinsicht als irrational bezeichnet werden müssen. Weil das Böse im Charakter der Person wurzelt, "verdirbt es den Grund aller Maximen" und verdient deshalb "das radikal Böse" genannt zu werden. Darüber hinaus sind menschliche Wesen nach Kant nicht nur für das Böse anfällig, es ist vielmehr unentrinnbar menschliches Schicksal, böse zu sein. Diese Thesen werfen eine Reihe von Fragen auf, unter ihnen die folgenden: Wie läßt sich, Kants Auffassungen über die Natur menschlichen Handelns vorausgesetzt, die Möglichkeit irrationalen, aber gleichwohl vom Standpunkt des Handelnden her explizierbaren und also freien Handelns erklären? Was ist das Wesen des radikal Bösen? In welchem Sinne verdirbt es den Grund aller Maximen? Warum behauptet Kant, das radikal Böse sei unentrinnbares Schicksal des Menschen? Der Beitrag ist diesen Fragen gewidmet. Er befaßt sich zuerst mit einigen Grundfragen und Grundunterscheidungen von Kants Handlungstheorie und seiner Theorie der praktischen Vernunft. Das erlaubt uns, Kants Auffassungen über das moralisch Böse zu verstehen. Abschnitt III wendet sich Kants Analyse des moralisch Bösen in seinen verschiedenen Ausprägungen zu, um auf dieser Grundlage eine allgemeine Charakterisierung des moralisch Bösen geben zu können. Abschnitt V befaßt sich mit Kants Behauptung, das radikal Böse verderbe den Grund aller Maximen, und mit ihren Implikationen für die Frage nach dem moralischen Wert von Handlungen überhaupt. In Abschnitt VI geht es um das, was man "Kants Universalitätsthese" nennen kann, d.i. seine Behauptung, menschliche Wesen seien notwendigerweise radikal böse. In seinem jüngst erschienenen Werk über Kant's Theory of Freedom vertritt Henry Allison die Meinung, UT enthalte einen synthetischen Satz a priori, und er legt eine "Ableitung" von UT vor, was Kant nicht getan hat. Ich versuche zu zeigen, daß Allisons Ableitung nicht schlüssig ist, obwohl ich - leider - keine eigene Deduktion anbieten kann, die Kants These stützt, noch einen Weg sehe, Kants eigene Verteidigung von UT mit ihrem angeblich apriorischen Status in Übereinstimmung zu bringen. Kants UT bleibt problematisch. (shrink)

Standard semantic information processing models—information in; information processed; information out —lend themselves to standard models of the functioning of the brain in terms, e.g., of threshold-switch neurons connected via classical synapses. That is, in terms of sophisticated descendants of McCulloch and Pitts models. I argue that both the cognition and the brain sides of this framework are incorrect: cognition and thought are not constituted as forms of semantic information processing, and the brain does not function in terms of passive input (...) processing units organized as neural nets. An alternative framework is developed that models cognition and thought not in terms of semantic information processing, and, correspondingly, models brain functional processes also not in terms of semantic information processing. As alternative to such models: I outline a pragmatist oriented, interaction based, model of representation; derive from this model a fundamental framework of constraints on how the brain must function; show that such a framework is in fact found in the brain, and develop the outlines of a broader model of how mental processes can be realized within this alternative framework. Part I of this discussion focuses on some criticisms of standard modeling frameworks for representation and cognition, and outlines an alternative interactivist, pragmatist oriented, model. In part II, the focus is on the fact that the brain does not, in fact, function in accordance with standard passive input processing models—e.g., information processing models. Instead, there are multiple endogenously active processes at multiple spatial and temporal scales across multiple kinds of cells. A micro-functional model that accounts for, and even predicts, these multi-scale phenomena in generating emergent representation and cognition is outlined. That is, I argue that the interactivist model of representation outlined offers constraints on how the brain should function that are in fact empirically found, and, in reverse, that the multifarious details of brain functioning entail the pragmatist representational model—a very strong interrelationship. In the sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented here: sometimes called the predictive brain approach. (shrink)

I. Introduction. II. Ratiocination vs. Cognition. III. Emotions as Modes of Cognition. IV. Four Competing Proposals. V. The Impact of Emotion on Cognition. VI. The Kinematics of Ratiocination. VII. Competing Cognitive Theories. VIII. Why think Emotions are Beliefs? IX. The Intentionality of Emotions. X. The Kinematics of Emotions. XI. A Unified Account of the Emotions. XII. The Rationality of Emotions.

At the outset of this discussion, I undertook to present an argument from design which would follow Swinburne's example in making use of a priori judgments, while avoiding some of the objections which have been posed in response to his treatment of these issues. So we need to ask: how does this approach to the question of design compare with Swinburne's?Swinburne argues that a chaotic world is a priori more likely than an ordered world: this consideration provides one central reason, (...) on his account, for giving an explanation of some sort for the world's regularity. The other central argument he advances for this claim is the argument from analogy (in terms of the coins) which we noted earlier. The approach I have taken offers an alternative route to this same conclusion. In particular, it substitutes the simpler a priori judgments recorded in (i) and (ii) for the rather difficult and contentious claim that chaos is a priori more likely than order. In place of this claim, I have offered the judgment that order, or recurrence, is more likely given the activity of a common source or common kind of source than otherwise: this proposal does not commit us to a view either way on the question of whether order is a priori likely per se. Moreover, in place of Swinburne's analogical argument, I have offered an a priori approach, with the advantages I have noted.Given that recurrence is to be explained, we might ask: why offer an explanation in terms of design? On this point, Swinburne argues, for instance, that no other explanation of temporal regularity is even possible a priori. Again, the a priori principles which I have used, in (iv) and (v), may be less ambitious, but at the same time more persuasive. In support of this same idea, Swinburne also cites various ideas to do with the predictive power of the idea of design. I have tried to bring out the role of this sort of consideration in terms of my principle (v). Principle (iv) has no place in Swinburne's account, in view of his reliance on the principle of simplicity as a measure of prior probability.Lastly, we may ask: if we are to cite a designer, are there reasons for attributing to this agent more powers than are needed for the production of the effect to be explained? On this point, Swinburne cites the principle of simplicity. Again, my approach avoids what has proved to be a relatively controversial judgment about the nature of a priori probabilities, offering in place of the principle of simplicity the less ambitious principle recorded in (iii). At this point, I have moreover inverted the logical sequence of Swinburne's argument: it seems to me that, in the ways I have indicated, it is helpful to consider the extent of the powers of the source of recurrence before addressing the question of design.In these various ways, I hope I have made good my undertaking to present an argument which avoids some of the controversy surrounding the particular measures of a priori probability which figure in Swinburne's argument. Moreover, I hope that this approach provides an indication of how a priori judgments may function in a relatively unproblematic way within an argument from design, in so far as (i)–(v) are all rather modest proposals. In sum, the argument I have presented is distinguished by its explicit use of the a priori judgments recorded in (i)–(v), by its attempt to buttress in this fashion analogical forms of argument, and by the logical role it gives to the idea that the source of regularity possesses more powers than are required for the production of this effect.Lastly, we might ask: how persuasive is this argument? Of course, the cogency of the idea of design depends upon the balance of debate in other areas of the philosophy of religion, especially upon our ability to provide some account of the existence of evil. In this paper, I have been concerned to argue simply that recurrence by kind provides evidence for design: I have not addressed the question of whether other features of the world provide good evidence against the idea of (benevolent) design. However, if we confine our attention to this one phenomenon, there is it seems to me good evidence for the idea of design, (i) and (ii) suggest that recurrence surely calls for some explanation; (iii), together with the existence in nature of statistical irregularities, suggests that whatever provides this explanation could have brought about other effects besides; and design seems the only clear explanation of why this effect should have been brought about, if (as I have argued) analogies drawn from vegetable and animal reproduction fail, and if we cannot explain the effect satisfactorily by reference to the conditions of observation. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons for supposing that the probability a priori of design is relatively high in relation to the probability a priori of any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. In brief, this is because the design hypothesis (unlike the hypothesis of theism) can cite an agent of relatively indeterminate power in order to account for the phenomenon to be explained. In this regard, it is less ‘precisely defined’ than any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. If all of this is so, then as philosophers from early times have supposed, temporal regularity provides the basis for a powerful argument in favour of design. It remains true, of course, that its import can be judged in full only when we have taken into account the relevance of other phenomena, many of which are apparently less favourable to the idea of design. (shrink)

DSM-III and its revisions have provided little in the way of explicit historical or philosophical foundations. The logical empiricism embedded in its operational criteria and its external approach to validation are inadequate to account for the presumption of nosological regularities or the specific categories endorsed by the taxonomy. The nosologic operation that Jaspers referred to as the "synthesis of disease entities" is explored in connection with the central distinction in DSM-IV between mood disorders and schizophrenic disorders. This synthetic operation is (...) analyzed in terms of the paradigmatic shift from the mania-melancholia matrix of pre-modern psychiatry to the manic-depression/dementia praecox model defined by the work of Kraepelin. In the context of this analysis the self-evidence of these regularities is questioned. Keywords: DSM-III, DSM-IV, mood disorders, nosology, schizophrenic disorders CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I show how to integrate nietzsche's apparently conflicting views on the relationship of philosophers to the ascetic ideal of the ascetic priest. in sections 7 and 8 of GM iii, Nietzsche makes philosophers seem fundamentally different from priests; but in sections 9 and 10, he argues that philosophers early on succumb to the ascetic ideal of the priest. the key to understanding how these two aspects of GM iii fit together lies in nietzsche's ideas about the (...) origins of contemplative life. priests and their ascetic ideal come first; philosophers come later. Though the ambitions of philosophers are radically unlike those of priests, the two types of contemplative nature share a common predicament in their earliest days, against the background of which it becomes understandable how philosophers as a class could have become more mixed up in the ascetic ideal than is good for them. (shrink)

La aplicación de la versión tradicional –estructurada en cuatro partes– de la doctrina católica del doble efecto a dos casos de conflicto materno-fetal –la histerectomía en el caso de cáncer de útero, y la craneotomía en el caso de parto obstruido–, ha originado cierta confusión entre los partidarios de las versiones –estructuradas en dos partes contemporáneas– del doble efecto. Aunque la craneotomía, no la histerectomía, fue prohibida de acuerdo a la DDE tradicional, pocos partidarios de las versiones contemporáneas de la (...) DDE consideran que estos casos sean significativamente diferentes. ¿La aplicación tradicional de la DDE a estos dos casos puede entenderse? Si así es, ¿esta aplicación sorprendente puede arrojar luz a los debates contemporáneos sobre el doble efecto? Este artículo trata estas dos preguntas. Se divide en tres apartados: en el apartado I se ofrece una panorámica sobre la génesis histórica –en la casuística católica romana– de las versiones de la DDE articuladas en cuatro partes; en el apartado II se discute las aplicaciones habituales de la DDE tradicional en cuatro partes a una serie de casos, y se presta una atención particular al análisis ortodoxo de los dos procedimientos de aborto terapéutico mencionados, la histerectomía y la craneotomía. Tras exponer tres concepciones de la acción intencional, la tomista, la davidsoniana y la goldmaniana, se muestra que desde ninguna de ellas esos casos pueden distinguirse en virtud de la intención; en el apartado III se lleva a cabo un análisis de lo que se denomina el principio de prioridad causal, que da sentido a la aplicación tradicional de la DDE a estos y otros casos. El artículo concluye explicando por qué se pensó que las tres primeras condiciones de la DDE tradicional, que se reducen a una en las versiones modernas del doble efecto, estaban relacionadas pese a ser diferentes. Por último, sugiero que los desafíos que propiciaron el desarrollo del principio de prioridad causal aclaran otros desafíos similares que deben ser afrontados por cualquier versión moderna adecuada del doble efecto. (shrink)

Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation.

Despite its proliferation in technology studies, the concept of “path dependence” has scarcely been applied to epistemology. In this essay, I investigate path dependence in the production of scientific knowledge, first, by considering Kuhn's scattered remarks that lend support to a path-dependence thesis (Section I) and second by developing and criticising Kuhn's embryonic account (Sections II and III). I examine a case from high-energy physics that brings the path-dependent nature of scientific knowledge to the fore and I pay attention to (...) two sources of path dependence—“theoretical” and “instrumental”. The latter source is particularly important in “big science”. I ask in Section IV whether path dependence in scientific knowledge can lead to circumstances like those in the technological field, in which a theory can come to dominate a scientific speciality even though it is inferior to alternatives. In Section V, I ask what implications my thesis has for science policy. (shrink)

A recent editorial in this journal calls for more philosophical work in the areas of philosophy of medical science and research methodology [1]. The purpose of the present paper is to bring to light and discuss some obstacles and opportunities for development in these areas. In section I, barriers to increased philosophical work in medicine outside ethics are discussed. In sections II and III, additional areas in medicine ripe for philosophical work are identified and discussed: (a) improving the epistemic fitness (...) of much current clinical reasoning, (b) defining the conditions under which greater epistemic fitness can be achieved, and (c) technology assessment. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis defends the claim that the principle of methodological solipsism can play no role in the formation of the theories of cognitive psychology. Corresponding to this negative claim, but assuming a comparatively minor role, will be the positive claim that a scientific psychology ought to deal in explanations which relate mental states in virtue of their semantic contents. ;The basis of the case against methodological solipsism is the (...) claim that the explanatory properties invoked by this principle are individuation dependent on properties of semantic content. In Chapter I the idea of methodological solipsism will be discussed, and two forms distinguished. One of the versions of methodological solipsism identified invokes the explanatory notion of the narrow content of a mental state. The other version invokes the notion of formal or syntactic properties possessed by mental states. In both cases it will be argued that these properties can be identified only by way of the semantic contents of their associated mental states. The notion of narrow content will be discussed in Chapter II. The case against that version of methodological solipsism which invokes syntactic properties will be constructed in Chapters III-V. The latter argument constitutes the bulk of the thesis, and derives from considerations centred around the principles of anomalism, supervenience, and the relation between them. These arguments are intended to be of independent interest as solutions to certain persistent problems in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Collating, for the first time, the key writings of Leonard Harris, this volume introduces readers to a leading figure in African-American and liberatory thought. -/- Harris' writings on honor, insurrectionist ethics, tradition, and his work on Alain Locke have established him as a leading figure in critical philosophy. His timely and urgent responses to structural racism and structural violence mark him out as a bold cultural commentator and a deft theoretician. -/- The wealth and depth of Harris' writings are (...) brought to the fore in this collection and the incisive introduction by Lee McBride serves to orient, contextualize, and frame an oeuvre that spans four decades. In his prolegomenon, Harris eschews the classical meaning of “philosophy,” supplanting it with an idiosyncratic conception of philosophy--philosophia nata ex conatu--that features an avowedly value-laden dimension. As well as serving as an introduction to Harris' philosophy, A Philosophy of Struggle provides new insights into how we ought conceptualize philosophy, race, tradition, and insurrection in the 21st century. (shrink)

This book collects nine seminal essays by Mark Richard published between 1980 and 2014, alongside four new essays and an introduction that puts the essays in context. Each essay is an attempt, in one way or another, to understand the idea of a proposition. Part I discusses whether the objects of thought and assertion can change truth value over time. Part II develops and defends a relativist view of the objects of assertion and thought; it includes discussions of the (...) nature of disagreement, moral relativism, and responds to important objections to relativism. It also explores the idea that thoughts and assertions may be neither true nor false. Part III discusses issues having to do with relations between sentential and propositional structure. Among the topics discussed in Part III are the semantics of quotation, 'mixed quotation', opacity, philosophical analysis and propositional structure, and the semantics of demonstratives and clausal complements. (shrink)

Fine (J. Philos. Logic 46(6):625–674, 2017a) sets out a theory of content based on truthmaker semantics which distinguishes two kinds of consequence between contents. There is entailment, corresponding to the relationship between disjunct and disjunction, and there is containment, corresponding to the relationship between conjunctions and their conjuncts. Fine associates these with two notions of parthood: disjunctive and conjunctive. Conjunctive parthood is a very useful notion, allowing us to analyse partial content and partial truth. In this chapter, I extend the (...) notion of disjunctive parthood in terms of a structural relation of refinement, which stands to disjunctive parthood much as mereological parthood stands to conjunctive parthood. Philosophically, this relation may be modelled on the determinable-determinate relation, or on a fact-to-fact notion of grounding. I discuss its connection to two other Finean notions: vagueness (understood via precisification) and arbitrary objects. I then investigate what a logic of truthmaking with refinement might look like. I argue that (i) parthood naturally gives rise to a relevant conditional; (ii) refinement underlies a relevant notion of disjunction; and so (iii) truthmaker semantics with refinement is a natural home for relevant logic. The resulting formal models draw on Fine’s (J. Philos. Logic 3(4):347–372, 1974) semantics for relevant logics. Finally, I use this understanding of relevant semantics to investigate the status of the mingle axiom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eleven brothers and sisters followed me in quick succession and the old farm house was bursting at the seams. So Mom and Dad put on a new dining room. Somehow it didn’t fit. It was built differently than the rest of the house. It was out of place, like a new patch on an old shirt. Some parts of the Later Rule of Saint Francis just don’t fit either. (...) They are “patches,” sewed on afterwards. Those little “patches” on the Later Rule stand out and they tell an important story.In 1221 Saint Francis re-edited the legislation of the Order. At the end of the twenty-four chapters of the new edition of the Rule, he commanded that “on behalf of Almighty God and of the Lord Pope, and by obedience ... that no one delete or add to what has been written in this life” . He would do everything possible to avoid changes, but just a couple of years later there was yet a newer edition of the Rule, which we know as the Later Rule. In his Testament, Francis does not distinguish between these two or, in fact, any of the different stages of the development of the Rule. In spite of the changes, even changes that were not to be expected, it seems that for Francis the Rule is one and the same at whatever stage.The Later Rule consists of twelve chapters. The chapters are not enumerated in the two original manuscripts, but rather are simply distinguished by headings set off from the rest of the text by bold lettering.2 The titles give us the theme of each chapter. It will become obvious to us that the number twelve was intentional and limiting, when we examine the Rule’s “patches” and see that they bring extraneous materials into the twelve chapters of the Rule. By “extraneous” I mean that the materials of the “patches” neither pertain to the principal theme of the chapter of the Later Rule into which they are inserted nor are they drawn from the corresponding chapter of the Earlier Rule. The “patches” do not make a good fit with the chapters in which we find them, but they do have two consistent characteristics: each of them comes at the end of its chapter in the Later Rule and, except for the last of the four patches, each of them includes materials from different chapters of the Earlier Rule. The “patches” we will examine are Chapter III, 10–13; Chapter VI, 7–9; Chapter X, 7–10, and Chapter XII, 3–4. The “patches” shed light on claims that Francis was forced to omit from the Rule ideas that were important to him, and even the myth that the whole original copy of the Rule was intentionally lost. They bring us to the conclusion that nothing important was lost in the transition from the Earlier Rule to the Later Rule.Chapter III, 10–13Chapter three of the Later Rule carries the heading, “The Divine Office, Fasting, and how the Brothers should go about in the World.” Chapter three of the Earlier Rule had also dealt with the divine office and fasting. The earlier text had begun with the saying of the Gospel that some evil spirits could only be driven out “through prayer and fasting” . This Gospel phrase explains why the Later Rule, following the Earlier Rule, deals with prayer and fasting in the same chapter. With respect to the Earlier Rule, Francis has included new content in the corresponding chapter of Later Rule. It is material that goes beyond the themes of prayer and fasting, and it doesn’t mesh neatly with these two themes.Chapter three of the Earlier Rule ends saying, “However, at other times, according to this life, let them not be.. (shrink)

Fisher criticised the Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing by arguing that it relies on the assumption of “repeated sampling from the same population.” The present article considers the responses to this criticism provided by Pearson and Neyman. Pearson interpreted alpha levels in relation to imaginary replications of the original test. This interpretation is appropriate when test users are sure that their replications will be equivalent to one another. However, by definition, scientific researchers do not possess sufficient knowledge about the relevant (...) and irrelevant aspects of their tests and populations to be sure that their replications will be equivalent to one another. Pearson also interpreted the alpha level as a personal rule that guides researchers’ behavior during hypothesis testing. However, this interpretation fails to acknowledge that the same researcher may use different alpha levels in different testing situations. Addressing this problem, Neyman proposed that the average alpha level adopted by a particular researcher can be viewed as an indicator of that researcher’s typical Type I error rate. Researchers’ average alpha levels may be informative from a metascientific perspective. However, they are not useful from a scientific perspective. Scientists are more concerned with the error rates of specific tests of specific hypotheses, rather than the error rates of their colleagues. It is concluded that neither Neyman nor Pearson adequately rebutted Fisher’s “repeated sampling” criticism. Fisher’s significance testing approach is briefly considered as an alternative to the Neyman-Pearson approach. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel version of mathematical fictionalism and defends it against three objections or worries, viz., (i) an objection based on the fact that there are obvious disanalogies between mathematics and fiction; (ii) a worry about whether fictionalism is consistent with the fact that certain mathematical sentences are objectively correct whereas others are incorrect; and (iii) a recent objection due to John Burgess concerning “hermeneuticism” and “revolutionism”.

Immanuel Kant's final publication in ethics was The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 The Metaphysics of Morals. This text presents Kant's normative ethical theory. This guide is meant to be read alongside Kant's text, combining accessible explanations and novel interpretations of this difficult text. It is the first book in English devoted to The Doctrine of Virtue, one of Kant's most significant works. -/- Timmons divides the guide into five parts. Part I reviews Kant's life, the history (...) and significance of The Doctrine of Virtue, and situates Kant's ethics within his general metaphysical and epistemological views. Part II is devoted to the General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, which is essential for understanding Kant's ethics. Part III and Part IV turn to The Doctrine of Virtue itself, exploring Kant's defense of a system of duties and corresponding virtues. Part V examines Kant's conception of moral education, the practice of virtue, and the conclusion to the book where Kant explains why the discipline of ethics does not include religion as a doctrine of duties to God. Timmons concludes the book highlighting key aspects of The Doctrine of Virtue, situating Kant's ethical theory in relation to other normative ethical theories. This guide is a vital resource for both students and scholars interested in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:344 BOOK REVIEWS philosophy-that even seriously disordered individuals always have the possibility of renewing themselves morally. What we need is, first, a detailed specification of the range of goods towards which reason directs us, then, an explanation of how reference to these goods is explicit or implicit in those precepts directive of action upon which prudence has to he able to draw (if it is to function in such (...) a way as to break with the otherwise vicious circle), and, finally, an explanation of how in the concrete circumstances of social life the precepts of reason can become effective. The absence of a systematic treatment of goods, which I noticed earlier, therefore turns out to he an important omission from Cessario's account, since without it a crucial part of his argument remains incomplete. What makes this omission all the more disappointing is the excellence of Cessario's subsequent discussion of the relationship of the theological virtues to the intellectual and moral virtues and of how the habitus of nature are enriched and strengthened by the habitus of grace. Teachers of moral theology could reflect on this discussion with great benefit to their students. It is a mark of how very good a hook Cessario has written that it arouses enormous impatience for a sequel which will not only carry the argument further hut also fill out what is missing in the argument so far. University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana ALASDAIR MAclNTYRE De vitiis et pecatis: In I-II Summae theologiae Divi Thomae expositio. By JACOBUS (SANTIAGO) M. RAMiREz, O.P. In Jacobus M. Ramirez Opera Omnia, tomus 8, ed. Victorino Rodriguez, O.P. Bihlioteca de Teologos Espafioles, 37 and 38. Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 1990. 2 volumes (Pp. xiv + 902). Paper: 5,000 pesetas (=approx. $47.00 U.S.). After a dormancy of some sixteen years, and fittingly on the eve of the centenary of its author's birth, the publication of Santiago Maria Ramirez's (t 1967) Opera Omnia continued in 1990 with the appearance of volume 8, De vitiis et peccatis: In I-II Summae theologiae Divi Thomae expositio. When completed, the Opera Omnia will contain not only vast writings on analogy and the nature of philosophy hut also the single most thorough, and arguably most profound, exposition of the Secunda pars of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae ever written. The present installment covers qq. 71-85 of the Prima secundae. BOOK REVIEWS 345 Although the Spanish province of the Dominican Order has taken over the publication and distribution of Ramirez's Opera Omnia from the Consejo Superior de lnvestigaciones Cientificas, who began the series and oversaw the publication and distribution of all previous volumes, the new volumes' physical constitution is identical to that of the earlier volumes, since the actual printing is done at the same house. The volumes read easily, not only because they are in octavo form, hut also because the publishers have done the printing on an off.white paper, with leisurely spacing of the 11 point type. The second volume contains four indices: an index of names, biblical references, references to Thomas's writings, and a schematized index of the contents of both volumes. In a project of this magnitude one is prepared to find printing mistakes, and there are occasional typographical errors and formatting errors such as mis-italicization. In one place there is an omission of an entire line. (In vol. 2, p. 537, no. 373, the citation from Innocent III, after the words ' visionis Dei,' should be completed with the following: " (= damni tantum), actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus.") But these are minor imperfections, and the editor Fr. Rodriguez once again deserves our thanks for making such learning tools available to us in so useful a format. Rodriguez has informed me that the next volume to appear will be De gratia in 1991, despite the fact that a treatment De lege would of course be in keeping with the order of the Prima secundae. The quantity of Ramirez's writing on the treatise on law did not justify a separate volume, so it will be included along with De iure gentium and De... (shrink)

The final twenty-five years of the thirteenth century have received relatively little treatment by historians of medieval philosophy. Yet this period, which spans roughly from the death of Thomas Aquinas to the arrival of Duns Scotus at Oxford, is characterized by a remarkable philosophical vitality. One of the more neglected figures of this period is James of Viterbo. A member of the Augustinian Order, James was a Master in the Theology faculty at Paris from 1293-1300. Making use of his recently (...) edited Quodlibetal Questions and De divinis praedicamentis, the dissertation presents a historical reconstruction of James' metaphysics of finite being. Like most medieval thinkers, James is very concerned to distinguish between finite being and infinite being. While the divine being is absolutely simple, pure act, every finite being has within itself a composition of act and potency. This means that finite being has a structure that can be explicated by metaphysical analysis. There are three kinds of metaphysical composition found among finite beings: essence and existence; substance and accident; and matter and form. The dissertation analyzes James' understanding of these three compositions. Chapters I-III examine his position on issues involving essence and existence. Chapters IV and V deal with substance and accident. Chapters VI and VII are concerned with problems arising from the composition of matter and form. In presenting James' thought the dissertation gives some attention to determining his place in the doctrinal milieu of the late thirteenth century. James develops his own metaphysical positions only after deep reflection on the views of his contemporaries. He knows quite well the texts of Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines, and he is familiar with the work of Thomas Aquinas. Although he strives often to harmonize opposed positions, James possesses a highly personal metaphysics that cannot be reduced to that of other thinkers. The dissertation finds evidence for including James within the Neo-Augustinian movement of his day. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: System and Method Part II: Intention and Interpretation Part III: Philosophy of Art Part IV: Historical Knowledge Part V: What Philosophy Is.

This work “is an attempt to analyse critically Plato’s views on mind and body and more particularly on the mind-body relationship within the wider setting of Plato’s metaphysics”. The book additionally promises to save Plato from Cartesian dualism, arguing instead that Plato’s dualism is of a sort which “may not fall victim to the accusations raised against Cartesianism”. Given the dearth of book-length studies on the mind-body relationship in Plato, this project is well motivated, and it is impressively researched as (...) well. Because this subject crucially involves interpretations of Plato’s ontology, the first half of the book is spent laying the groundwork for the discussions of Part III on the Platonic conception of mind. (shrink)

Is PDP Connectionism compatible with Cognitive Linguistics? It is unfortunate that this question has not received the attention it deserves, since at stake is the very possibility of a unified "West Coast Cognitive Science" approach to language. Part I of this paper argues that a systematic approach to the question of compatibility must involve an enumeration and analysis of the general principles used by each research program in their linguistic explanations. This approach is carried out in Parts II and III, (...) and the conclusion is that the explanatory principles of PDP Connectionism are fundamentally data-driven, whereas those of Cognitive Linguistics rely essentially on structure that the mind contributes to language use. Part IV presents several computational models of metaphor and analogy as case studies of the practical difficulties involved in reconciling these two frameworks. Finally, Part V examines the philosophical foundations of their respective explanatory strategies in order to get a clearer view of the theoretical obstacles to a unified account. (shrink)

The paper considers the possibility of an alliance between natural theologians and environmental ethicists in so far as both uphold the goodness of the natural world. Specifically, it examines whether the work of Holmes Rolston III can contribute towards the natural theologian’s treatment of two issues: the nature and extent of the world’s goodness, and the reasons why we may fail to register its goodness fully. The paper argues that the holism and non-anthropocentrism of Rolston’s work throw new light on (...) the values in nature, and on the multiple achievements which are presupposed in any informed appreciation of its goodness. (shrink)

This essay applies a plausible model for moral growth to examples of secular and religious children’s literature. The point is that moral maturation, given this model, requires imaginary worlds on both secular and religious presuppositions. Trying to guide a child’s reading toward either religious or secular books rather than toward good literature is shown therefore to miss the mark of good parenting.

In this paper, we discuss Martin Heidegger's position on the so-called godlessness of our current age. Rather than holding that we must either await the advent of god or enthusiastically embrace our godlessness, Heidegger holds that a third option is available to us: we could fundamentally change the way we experience the world by leaving behind all remnants of metaphysical thinking. In Section II, we show that, despite the absence of god, our current historical moment shares a metaphysical structure with (...) the god-oriented epochs that preceded it. A metaphysical epoch involves a single, all-encompassing understanding of the entities in the world and how they ought to be arranged, usually established by a God who serves as a paradigm for those entities. In Section III, we discuss how the metaphysical age arose in the first place; the polytheistic world of the ancient Greeks was tumultuous and unpredictable, such that its inhabitants began to desire a stable, planned-out world that could be established by a single God. In the final section, we examine Heidegger's obscure discussion of the last god, who is to lead us out of metaphysics by a fundamental shift of the sort that led us into metaphysics. We discuss the basic features that will define a post-metaphysical age, and the last god's role in bringing this age about. We argue that this age resembles the pre-metaphysical age of the ancient Greeks, but rather than being polytheistic, it will be “polydivinistic”. (shrink)

Fine (2017a) sets out a theory of content based on truthmaker semantics which distinguishes two kinds of consequence between contents. There is entailment, corresponding to the relationship between disjunct and disjunction, and there is containment, corresponding to the relationship between conjunctions and their conjuncts. Fine associates these with two notions of parthood: disjunctive and conjunctive. Conjunctive parthood is a very useful notion, allowing us to analyse partial content and partial truth. In this chapter, I extend the notion of disjunctive parthood (...) in terms of a structural relation of refinement, which stands to disjunctive parthood much as mereological parthood stands to conjunctive parthood. Philosophically, this relation may be modelled on the determinable- determinate relation, or on a fact-to-fact notion of grounding. I discuss its connection to two other Finean notions: vagueness (understood via precisification) and arbitrary objects. I then investigate what a logic of truthmaking with refinement might look like. I argue that (i) parthood naturally gives rise to a relevant conditional; (ii) refinement underlies a relevant notion of disjunction; and so (iii) truthmaker semantics with refinement is a natural home for relevant logic. The resulting formal models draw on Fine’s (1974) semantics for relevant logics. Finally, I use this understanding of relevant semantics to investigate the status of the mingle axiom. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World. By Holmes Rolston, III.

This study evaluated how call center agents manage their emotions when interacting with customers with different emotional states. The coping mechanisms employees develop through experience can impact their communication and satisfaction with customer service. A study was conducted using a descriptive-correlational design in three Business Process Outsourcing companies in Cebu City, Philippines. The study aimed to determine employees' agreement and effectiveness in self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management. An online sample size calculator was used to gather data, and 150 (...) respondents were chosen out of 243 call center agents. The data was analyzed using simple frequency, percentage, weighted mean, and ANOVA type III. The study indicates that age is crucial in the respondents' self-management (F ratio= 3,146, p= .412). This suggests that BPO employees become better at managing themselves as they get older. Additionally, the study respondents' monthly income significantly impacts their social awareness level (F ratio= 5,144, p= .040). This means that those with higher incomes tend to have greater social awareness than those with lower incomes. The BPO industry should prioritize candidates with high emotional intelligence during hiring. They can better adapt to the fast-paced work environment. Graveyard shift workers should receive higher wages and benefits. Employees should attend workshops on management, leadership, and emotional intelligence. Annual team-building events should also be considered for a positive work environment. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...) than sui generis; (ii) that this explanatory burden can be successfully met vis-à-vis the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and in other related cases; and (iii) that the burden cannot be met for (putative) objective moral supervenience relations. (shrink)